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3EPG sessions the SG had sat in on, the SG had never 
expressed this concern. Nonetheless, although some 
governments erroneously thought that the proposal had 
been ruled out at the meeting in Perth, it was in fact 
deferred to the SG and to CMAG, with a chairperson 
yet to be elected, who were asked to consider ‘relevant 
options’. It is possible that a final decision may be made 
by all Commonwealth Foreign Ministers at the end of 
September 2012 when they meet in New York in the 
wings of the UN General Assembly.
Substantive issues relating to the Commissioner, or any 
similar office, have been covered in a memorandum that 
I and the Commonwealth Advisory Bureau presented to 
the SG and CMAG earlier this year.2 Suffice it to say 
that the governments which favour such a mechanism 
believe Commonwealth aspirations for democracy, the 
rule of law and human rights – likely to be restated in 
the Commonwealth Charter – will stay as hot air and 
hypocrisy without a qualified and largely independent 
mechanism to verify abuse and recommend redress.
Opponents have argued that such a mechanism could 
erode the role of the SG, push CMAG beyond its 
agreed purposes, and lead to extra expense. Behind 
these divergences lie other conflicts, about whether 
the Commonwealth is serious about providing more 
meaningful protection for its citizens, and whether its 
development agenda is being hijacked, with preference 
being given to matters of governance.
Here, I want to focus on the need to build consensus, 
on the dysfunctional nature of a Commonwealth where 
only three states pay approximately two-thirds of the 
cost of the Commonwealth Secretariat, and on the need 
for the SG to play a leadership role. These three issues 
are intertwined and, if the Commonwealth is truly to be 
modernised this year, there has to be significant change.
You should never believe your own propaganda, 
and there is a litany of propagandist claims for the 
Commonwealth which do not stand up to scrutiny: that it 
is particularly good at peacemaking, peculiarly effective 
at development, or even a global beacon for democracy, 
the rule of law and fundamental human rights. Just now 
it is faced with another challenge to its rhetoric, that it 
is an international leader in consensus-building. Can 
its Secretariat, in the next few weeks, forge consensus 
among its member governments over the issue which 
divided leaders most bitterly when they met in Perth, 
Australia last year?
This divisive issue was the second proposal made by 
the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) which, chaired by 
Malaysia’s former prime minister Abdullah Badawi,  had 
been mandated to suggest how the Commonwealth 
could be modernised. Their first suggestion was 
that there should be a Commonwealth charter. The 
second was that “A Commonwealth Commissioner for 
Democracy, the Rule of Law and Human Rights should 
be appointed to provide well-researched and reliable 
information simultaneously to the Secretary-General 
(SG) and Chairperson of the Commonwealth Ministerial 
Action Group (CMAG) on serious or persistent violations 
of democracy, the rule of law and human rights in 
member states and to indicate approaches for remedial 
action.”1
During that fierce discussion in Australia it was clear 
that the key donor nations – Australia, Canada and 
the United Kingdom (UK) – were keen to adopt such 
a position. However, several developing countries, 
including a few which have faced international criticism 
in the areas of democracy, rule of law and human 
rights, were strongly opposed to the idea and the SG 
Mr Kamalesh Sharma told heads of government that 
he did not support it. Mr Badawi said that in all of the 
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especially in a fractious and heterogeneous family 
like the Commonwealth. In the controversy over the 
Commissioner idea there is a danger that the paymasters 
look as though they are lined up against the rest, 
and that countries which have little to lose financially 
are denouncing the hands that feed them. Plainly, no 
organisation can afford to turn its back on its funders, 
yet this rupture may destabilise not only the governance 
and rights agenda, but also the development agenda 
too.
A number of developing countries have already indicated 
that the EPG said too little about development, and 
that practical budgetary measures at the Secretariat 
threaten staff reductions in areas such as health, 
education and agriculture. The post of the recently 
retired Deputy Secretary-General (DSG) responsible 
for development cooperation, Ransford Smith, is being 
left vacant for the time being. The resources available 
to the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation 
(CFTC), the voluntary ‘grey matter’ advisory fund set up 
in 1971, have fallen massively in real terms since the 
1980s. They are now running at around £30 million 
a year.4 Furthermore, following critical reports by the 
Department for International Development, the UK and 
AusAid, and other donor reviews of the Secretariat’s 
development work, both Canada and New Zealand 
have cut their voluntary contributions to CFTC. It also 
appears that Singapore, whose contribution is largely 
in the form of Commonwealth training in the city-state, 
has, in effect, done the same.
The political significance of the vote of no confidence 
from these governments is considerable. The CFTC 
was set up by a Canadian SG, Arnold Smith, and for 
many years Canada was its biggest or second largest 
contributor; in consequence, several Canadians were 
DSGs, responsible for development cooperation, the 
most recent being Nick Hare from 1993–2000. The 
New Zealand case is equally telling, as Don McKinnon, 
who appealed for increased subscriptions to CFTC 
when he was SG, had previously been foreign minister 
in another government dominated by the National Party, 
which has just cut its dues. And the CFTC was set up at 
the Singapore summit of 1971. 
Plainly, the Commonwealth Secretariat has a major 
job of fence-mending to do. This is not only a matter 
of politics but of finance. Both the Secretariat and 
The Perth Heads of Government Meeting was not the 
first at which there have been serious disputes between 
member states. In the 1980s there were a series of 
rows over South African apartheid between the UK 
government, led by Margaret Thatcher, and the majority 
of other members. The original EPG which visited South 
Africa was set up in the Bahamas in 1985 and was 
the product of a carefully crafted consensus in which 
Sonny Ramphal, then SG, worked with leaders including 
Rajiv Gandhi (India), Bob Hawke (Australia) and Brian 
Mulroney (Canada) as well as Margaret Thatcher. As 
described by Stuart Mole in the June 2012 issue of 
the Round Table journal,3 this EPG was working in the 
context of additional sanctions against the white regime, 
and calls to unban the African National Congress and 
release its most prominent member, Nelson Mandela, 
from more than two decades of imprisonment on 
Robben Island. It was part of a package.
Again in 1995, when the writer and environmental activist 
Ken Saro-Wiwa, and other leaders of the minority Ogoni 
people, were executed by Nigeria’s Abacha dictatorship 
at a time when Commonwealth leaders were meeting 
in New Zealand, the instant expulsion of Nigeria 
from the Commonwealth, proposed by South African 
President Mandela, was headed off. It was substituted 
by the suspension of the regime from the councils of 
the Commonwealth, and the establishment of CMAG. 
Chief Emeka Anyaoku, then SG, deftly used the crisis to 
take the association forward. Had Nigeria actually been 
expelled, his own position as a Nigerian SG might have 
been untenable.
The most recent internal crisis for the Commonwealth, 
where its consensus-building was less successful, 
culminated in President Robert Mugabe withdrawing 
Zimbabwe in 2003. Mugabe’s regime had come under 
sustained criticism for human rights and electoral abuse. 
A bland statement at the Abuja summit, by a mediatory 
group chaired by P.J. Patterson, prime minister of 
Jamaica, was not enough to assuage Mugabe’s amour-
propre. When Tony Blair, the then UK prime minister, 
gave a thumbs up at Abuja airport, on learning of 
Zimbabwe’s departure, the South African president 
Thabo Mbeki denounced  the Patterson group’s agreed 
statement, to which he had been party. A key reason for 
the failure of consensus-building on Zimbabwe, aside 
from the nature of the Mugabe regime, was a lack of 
empathy with African and other Commonwealth leaders 
by the then SG, Don McKinnon, a New Zealander.
5has become increasingly obvious, in the proliferation 
of international diplomacy over the last two decades, 
is that leaders of Commonwealth states no longer pay 
much attention to the Commonwealth. The demands 
of domestic politics, and more exciting international 
negotiations, have for them out-competed what is often 
seen as a staid, marginal and pre-cyber survival. Most, 
particularly rulers from the smaller and poor states, 
depend very heavily on the dynamism and imagination 
of the Commonwealth SG, and his relatively small 
staff. The EPG described this as ‘on a par numerically 
with the World Meteorological Organisation (295) 
on the International Maritime Organisation (290) – 
organisations with a much smaller remit.’ 
Hence, if the SG does not do something, or instruct 
his staff to do something, it is unlikely to happen. The 
experiment of a ‘Chairperson-in-Office’, adopted in 
1999 and designed to give continuing authority for 
two years to a Head of Government who has chaired 
a summit, has been a failure. The buck stops with the 
Secretary-General. When the EPG, in the context of 
violations of Commonwealth values, impressed on the 
SG that ‘silence is not an option’ it was acknowledging 
that there has been plenty of silence in the past. The 
Commonwealth bias towards behind-the-scenes 
diplomacy has, as the EPG pointed out, allowed abusers 
‘to continue to violate the Commonwealth’s values.’ On 
the development side it is less clear than it should be, or 
than it was at Marlborough House in the past, that the 
Commonwealth Secretariat has been struggling with 
might and main to lift the poorest citizens out of poverty.
So what kind of consensus could a proactive SG try to 
negotiate in the present stand-off over ‘Commissioner’ 
and ‘development’? In the past the Secretariat has 
sometimes brought together key antagonists in a 
dispute, with one or two neutrals, in an attempt to 
hammer out an agreement. But it is time now to impart 
some home truths to the parties. Consensus-building 
will need more than just a sticking-plaster compromise.
The problem is that the Commonwealth does not 
seem fully committed to the dual mantra, most 
strongly expressed at Harare in 1991 but with longer 
antecedents, that its most serious, long-term purpose 
is both democracy and development – development 
with democracy, and democracy with development. As 
Don McKinnon once said, you cannot eat democracy; 
slightly separate CFTC budgets are unbalanced. The 
strange effect of the adjustments to the Secretariat 
budget, agreed in Trinidad in 2009, was actually to 
make it more dependent on the subscriptions from the 
major donor countries;5 the neo-colonial idea that the 
Commonwealth consists of four developed6 and 50 
developing countries, deriving from disparities in the 
1960s but seriously out of date in an era of BRICS,7 
commodity booms and developed world recession, 
will have to be challenged head-on. Fortunately, the 
subscription table has to be reviewed in 2014, and it 
is time the distribution better reflected the economic 
success of emerging economies and middle income 
states, improving the overall sense of mutual ownership.
The CFTC budget is not the only, and arguably not the 
most important, test of Secretariat commitment to the 
development agenda. Major research, advocacy and 
consensus-building are still carried out in its Economic 
Affairs division, now sadly a seventh of its size in the 
1980s. But although numerous Indian experts have 
for years been key consultants, heading the CFTC’s 
South-South service, the Secretariat has not only failed 
to persuade developed countries to expand their CFTC 
donations, it has witnessed a reduction in contributions 
from Singapore, which has made a dramatic success 
of its development, and has also failed to get a really 
enlarged contribution from fast-growing India. Even 
after its cuts, the small country of New Zealand was 
pledging £1.59 million to CFTC in 2011–12 to India’s 
£1.06 million, and an anticipated £140,000 from 
Singapore.8 Unlike the UK, constrained to put most of 
its multilateral aid through the European Union, India 
could put much more through the Commonwealth as it 
grows richer.
Commenting on such issues in the current Round Table, 
Krishan Srinivasan, former head of the Indian foreign 
service and DSG (Political) at the Secretariat from 1995–
2002 states ‘[India] has recently extended grants of $5 
billion to Africa, and $1 billion each to Afghanistan and 
Bangladesh, and has a regular development assistance 
programme for foreign countries itself, which is about 
as well funded as the total aid it receives from abroad.’9
The only route to real progress for the governance 
and development agendas, with compromises that can 
steer both ahead, lies through Marlborough House, 
headquarters of the Commonwealth Secretariat. What 
6agendas far more energetically, and in a more challenging 
way, than ever before: a new consensus must be built, 
beyond the sterile North/South squabbling of the past. 
Here, the Secretariat should see itself as a strategic 
initiator, calling on qualified, sympathetic players – the 
Commonwealth Parliamentarians, Commonwealth 
Business Council and many others – to contribute more 
as required. The EPG report was not just addressed 
to the Secretariat and Foundation but to all those who 
value the Commonwealth, and use its name.
The Commonwealth depends on its Secretariat, which 
itself needs to be in regular touch with its governments. 
It has to aim higher, and persuade more, for consensus-
building is not a matter of the lowest common 
denominator. Nor is the role of SG – as Prime Minister 
Muldoon of New Zealand once insultingly said to Sonny 
Ramphal – just to take the minutes. When Foreign 
Ministers meet in New York in late September, to deal 
with all the EPG’s unfinished business, Commonwealth 
citizens will see whether their Commonwealth is rising to 
the challenge, and whether their governments actually 
want to use it in their interests. 
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similarly, a government which becomes a conspiracy 
against its people – as the Abacha regime was in Nigeria 
– has no place in the councils of the Commonwealth.
But the Commonwealth needs to move on from these 
basics, and grow up. The Secretariat has for some years 
been promoting the office of Ombudsman in member 
states; this fact-finding and arbitration service does 
not infringe the privileges of a government. Yet the 
proposed office of ‘Commissioner’ is not so different on 
a Commonwealth scale from that of Ombudsman, and 
need not infringe the powers of an SG. Furthermore, 
those governments which are pushing the democracy, 
law and rights agenda need to be reminded that in 
all countries these remain aspirations – constantly 
conflicted – as recent debates on a second chamber 
and press regulation in the UK are testifying. The 
beauty of the Commonwealth, with the variety of its 
members, is that diverse intellects and traditions can 
be exchanged in a vital field where there are no right 
answers. The bottom line is that citizens are enabled to 
‘throw the rascals out’,10 live under an impartial law, and 
get effective human rights protection.
Similarly, much more work needs to be done on the 
development agenda. An Indian SG must be especially 
aware of this, given that his country is home to about a third 
of the world’s poor. What is the Commonwealth doing to 
mobilise its members to achieve realistic progress after 
the Millennium Development Goals11 run out in 2015? 
How is it making sense of the agreement to foster the 
Sustainable Development Goals,12 recently arrived at 
in Rio de Janeiro? What does the failure of the current 
economic and regional arrangement in Europe mean 
not only to the incomes of developing countries, but also 
to the political planning that underpins organisations 
in which the Commonwealth has a strong interest 
– the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and 
the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation 
(SAARC)? Here, too, the Commonwealth can be at the 
cutting edge: it may not have large budgets, but it is not 
short of brainpower, or political nous.
If 2012 is to be transformational for the Commonwealth, 
as Kamalesh Sharma has argued publicly, it will not be 
the result of a minor quid pro quo of ‘Commissioner’ 
versus ‘development’. It will be the product of a serious 
effort to galvanise many governments to take both these 
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